How I Lost Tout
September 30, 2005
Last year around this time I wrote a column chronicling how I managed
to finish first over a tremendous field of baseball and fantasy
baseball experts in the AL Tout Wars competition. In it, I
compared my teams' tendency for storming from behind in the second half
to that of legendary racehorse Seabiscuit. In retrospect, that
might not have been the best choice for analogy because in the race
directly following his historic match race upset of heavily favored
Triple Crown winner War Admiral, Seabiscuit pulled up lame.
"Pulling up lame" would be a generous description of what my Tout team
did this year; "inert from the beginning" seems more accurate.
Just as a
pitcher was a
significant key to
my
victory in 2004, so too was a pitcher the seed of my failure this
year. But it wasn't his performance on the field that killed me;
it was his cost at the draft.
A number of people have suggested that I wasn't able to employ my usual
draft strategy of avoiding any player who cost more than $25 and that
is what doomed my team. There may be some truth to that as a
number of other owners seemed to have at least an eye toward mimicking
what I did last year. And truth be told, four of the top six
teams in this year's finish bought two or fewer players who cost $25 or
more. Unfortunately, mine won't be one of them but their strong
finishes appear to give some additional legitimacy to the
strategy.
Others might point to the abnormally high number of down years I got
from the players I did roster. Vernon Wells and Vlad Guerrero,
the two players I spent a fair chunk of my salary allowance on, both
failed to meet expectations albeit only slightly. Despite being
given full-time positions to start the year, Michael Cuddyer and Travis
Lee both fumbled their way to having their playing time reduced as the
season progressed. I took a risk in the middle infield rostering
rookies Jose Lopez and Jason Bartlett. Lopez had a clear shot to
establish himself to start the year when Pokey Reese went down with a
shoulder injury, but he also fell victim to injury just before the
season began. Bartlett got off to a shaky start which prompted a
demotion to AAA for a couple of months. I had expected that Frank
Thomas would return from his ankle injury in July to give me three
decent months of production, but his injury healed slower than
expected, he came back a little too soon and got re-injured. So
all I ended up from him was a month of homers followed by a front row
seat for his return to the DL. Dmitri Young came up lame
mid-season which affected his production the rest of the way.
Bobby Kielty also came up lame which cost him at bats in the second
half. But even knowing what I know now, I don't think I would
have done anything different in drafting these particular
players. They were all decent risks that just had the
breaks go against them.
No, my biggest mistake came when I rostered a much lesser known
player. Here's
what
I said immediately after the draft - "Things were going fairly
smoothly until
Juan
Cruz' name came up. Normally, he's the kind of high upside
pitcher I'll pay an extra dollar or two to grab. But that's a
luxury of the mid-level game I usually play. With a large chunk
of my budget allocated by the middle rounds, penurious use of the
remaining dollars was important in order to get the best possible
talent with the end game bargains. The difference between a $1
player and a $2 player at that point can be huge. But for some
reason I lost sight of that and obsessed on getting Cruz. It cost
me $7. Don't get me wrong, I love the guy's talent and I'm pretty
confident he can earn $7 even if he doesn't get a save this year.
But at the point I acquired him, I would have been much better
off letting him go and spending that extra $6 on outfielders.
Instead of BJ Surhoff and Joe Borchard - two guys I'm not overly
confident will get over 250 at bats this season - I could have
picked up Gary Matthews, Grady Sizemore, Gabe Gross or Jay Payton, all
guys I like a lot more."
For the record, Borchard has all of five major league at bats this
season. BJ Surhoff did a little better, finishing with slightly
more than 300 ABs, hitting .260 with 5 homers, 30 runs and 31
RBI. But the other four outfielders I mentioned that I had
targeted have done the following so far this season with three games
left to play:
Matthews - .255, 17 homers, 71 runs, 52 RBI, 9 steals
Sizemore - .291, 22 homers, 111 runs, 81 RBI, 22 steals
Gross - .235, 1 homer, 10 runs, 6 RBI, 1 steal
Payton - .272, 18 homers, 62 runs, 63 RBI, 0 steals.
As you can see, any one of those guys would have been better than
Borchard and three of the four could have made a huge difference in the
standings. Payton alone could have been worth 14 points in
homers, runs and RBI. Moreover, because of the hole created in
the outfield due to my insistence on acquiring Cruz, I had to make a
trade earlier than I would normally in order to shore up my offensive
deficiency. That trade, unfortunately, turned out to be Tim
Wakefield for
Jody
Gerut. At the time it didn't seem like a terrible deal
because the same week it was consummated, Cleveland team doctors
declared that
Coco
Crisp would miss up to 3 months of the season due to a hand injury,
thus making Gerut a full-time player in a potent Indians'
line-up. Obviously, it didn't turn out that way. A week
later it was determined that Crisp's injury would only cost him a week
or two, then Gerut fumbled his way completely out of Cleveland... then
Chicago... and then for all intents and purposes, Pittsburgh,
too. In the meantime, Wakefield chipped in 12 wins, 119 Ks and a
1.18 WHIP for another team. Even worse, without Wakefield's
quality innings to stabilize my staff, I had to rely on waiver pitchers
like
Sean Douglass
for innings. That wasn't so bad while he was doing well in July,
but when he gave up 30 earned runs over a span of five August starts it
destroyed my team's chances of moving up in ERA. It also meant
that I had to keep hoping that I could get some decent innings from
Joe Mays.
That, my friends, is the height of wishful thinking. And lastly,
the unresolved hole in my outfield forced me to look to other positions
for additional production. Unfortunately, the only position that
consistently had options on the free agent market was catcher and most
of those were guys who'd be lucky to get 100 at bats. Sifting
through that list on a weekly basis to finally end up with
Sal Fasano ended
up costing me 21 FAAB, or more than a fifth of my total
allotment. So not only was it bad that Cruz didn't perform as
expected - shoulder troubles to start the season sent him to the DL,
then to AAA - but the residual effect of acquiring him dominoed
into plenty more troubles.
My friend Steve Moyer once said that in a league where the competition
is so evenly matched the eventual winner is usually determined by who
finishes with the fewest injuries. There may be some merit there
although my squad certainly had it's
fair share of injuries
last year. Unfortunately, my mistake in the draft cost me an
opportunity to test that theory this year.
So... what to take from my misfortune... well, there are several
lessons I learned:
For one, I probably won't depend as much on production from
rookies. I had four on my squad and three failed to
produce. Bartlett and Lopez will eventually be good players,
probably as soon as next year; Borchard was simply a bad choice.
Joe Mauer turned out pretty well for me so avoiding rookies altogether
is taking it to an unnecessary extreme. It's just important to
understand that plenty of managers either don't have the patience to
endure their struggles or don't trust them to produce like they did in
the minors. So rostering rookies has additional risks beyond what
they may or may not produce on the field.
The second lesson is to take my own advice and never make a trade
before June unless it's simply too good to pass up. Trading
Wakefield in what would turn out to be his career year for Gerut, a
player coming back from injury, will go down as one of the worst trades
of the season and possibly the worst I've ever made. Instead, I
should have been more aggressive with my FAAB, paying top dollar for
available free agents like Damon Hollins, Aaron Hill and Chris
Shelton.
The third lesson I learned is never pay for a back-up catcher.
Frankly, it's pretty rare to get decent production from that spot so
it's probably not worth spending any FAAB on once the season
begins.
But the final and most important lesson, to paraphrase Thucydides who
opined that "a collision at sea can ruin your whole day", is that a
blunder in the draft can ruin your whole season. Never obsess on
acquiring a player, especially one who is not guaranteed a position or
a role and/or who hasn't demonstrated that he can succeed in his
potentially new role. When I left the draft I was hoping that
Cruz would come through for me, either establishing himself as a
starter or as a closer because if he didn't I would have a major
struggle on my hands for the 2005 season. My fear turned out to
be prophetic. That was an especially tough lesson because it
slapped me in the face every day for the entire season.
Even though my season is concluding on a down note, I learned enough
that I can hope my earlier comparison to Seabiscuit turns out to be
prophetic as well. America's most beloved steed - there was an
urban legend that the horse generated more newsprint in the US than
either Adolf Hitler or FDR during his prime - miraculously recovered
from his career- and life-threatening injury to return to his winning
ways the following year. Hopefully, my columns have been helpful
to your fantasy baseball endeavors this year. Good luck next
season. Namaste.