The Failure of
Moneyball
June 3, 2008
Several years ago, Michael Lewis created a sensation with his book,
"Moneyball". In it, he chronicled the behind-the-scenes of GM
Billy Beane and the
Oakland A's front office, highlighting their philosophy that emphasized
taking only college players and focusing on hitters who get on
base. At the time, those two traits were not as highly
valued in potential draft picks as taking younger players with superior
physical tools and thus the A's would be able to save money both in
signing players and by using a much smaller scouting department.
Their theory was that
college stats were as good as upper level minor league stats as
indicators of future performance. By drafting
players they thought would have major league value but that no one else
prized, the money they saved would enable them to compete with bigger
revenue organizations like the Yankees and Dodgers. The story
largely followed the events leading up
to the 2002 amateur draft, a draft in which the A's had managed to get
seven picks in the first round through free agent compensation.
That draft, it turns out, was one of the most talent-laden drafts in
recent memory. The number of star-level and major league talents
that have emerged from that class already is pretty amazing: BJ Upton,
Adam
Loewen, Zack Greinke, Prince Fielder, Jeff Francis, Jeremy Hermida, Joe
Saunders, Khalil Greene, Scott Kazmir, Cole Hamels, James Loney, Jeremy
Guthrie, Jeff Francoeur, Matt Cain, Joey Votto, Micah Owings, David
Bush, Jon Lester, Jonathan Broxton, Jesse Crain, Brian McCann, Fred
Lewis, Elijah Dukes, Ben Francisco, Curtis Granderson, Rich Hill, Kevin
Correia, John Maine, Scott Olsen, Pat Neshek, Matt Capps, Howie
Kendrick, Matt Lindstrom, Joel Zumaya, Jason Bergmann, Jeff Clement,
Anthony Reyes, Dana Eveland, Russell Martin and Chuck James. It's
a
veritable who's who of the best young players in the game.
With so much talent to be had, one would think that the A's using
their "superior" philosophy of getting high on base hitters would
should
certainly lead them to talent riches, yes? Or that focusing
on
college players, whose stats they surmised could be relied upon in the
evaluation
process, would yield more than the average number of major league
regulars. Of the 41 players taken in that first round, 24 have
already appeared in the majors and 19 of those have had significant
playing time. So who did the A's get in the first
round?
Nick Swisher, Joe Blanton, John McCurdy, Ben Fritz, Jeremy
Brown, Steve Obenchain, Mark Teahen
It's not a coincidence that I listed the aforementioned successful
young major leaguers in the order in which they were picked, or at
least by
their respecitve ranking in the draft order. Swisher was taken
between Kazmir
and Hamels. That's not a bad pick as Swisher has turned into a
pretty good hitter and a useful player in the outfield and first base.
Blanton was taken between
Francoeur and Cain. Given the talent, I'd rather have Cain than
Blanton but I
would
still call Blanton a sucessful pick. However, it was between Cain
and Joey Votto (who was taken in the second round) that the A's picked
McCurdy,
Fritz, Brown,
Obenchain and Teahen.
The A's got three legitimate major league players (Teahen has become a
useful spare part ) out of seven in a first round that is probably the
closest we'll ever
see to a "can't miss" first round. None of the A's picks are what
any
rational person would label as a superstar. Given the impact some
of the other players have already had in the majors, why isn't anyone
looking at the results of the Moneyball draft and calling it what it
is: a failure. Even if you want to forgive them for focusing
only on college players, they still failed to identify Bush, Crain,
Lewis, Granderson, Hill, Correia, Maine, Neshek, Kendrick, Lindstrom,
Reyes, Eveland, Martin and James as major league talent, all of whom
were college players. During any normal year, getting two solid
major leaguers in the first round would be a coup. But in a year
so robust not only with major league regulars but with budding
superstars, getting just two legitimate regulars out of seven chances
is pretty poor results. That's like walking into a showroom of
high-end sports cars and driving away with a Miata.
Some would suggest signability was a major factor in their decisions,
that the A's needed to save money on their picks. If that was
indeed the case, why did they trade for David Justice and his $7
million salary in December of 2001, especially after posting a .763 OPS
with the Yankees? It worked out for them as Justice had a nice
final year for the A's but they could have signed Rondell White was for
$4.5 million or Ron Gant for just above major league minimum, both guys
in Justice's class of production. No telling how many other less
expensive options were avialable in trade.
The following year, the A's had three picks in the first round and took
Brad Sullivan, Brian Snyder and Omar Quintanilla. This draft was
also replete with major league talent that included Delmon Young,
Rickie Weeks, Nick Markakis, John Danks, Lastings Milledge, Aaron Hill,
Conor Jackson, Chad Cordero and Chad Billingsley, all taken before the
A's got their first pick. However, Carlos Quentin (another
college player) was taken after the A's had taken their first two
picks, and Chris Ray, Ryan Garko, Shaun Marcum, Jonathan Papelbon, Ryan
Braun, Kevin Kouzmanoff, Brian Bannister and Reggie Willits - all
college players - were taken after Quintanilla. Twenty-five of
the players (out of 37 this time) taken in the first round of the 2003
draft have since made the majors, yet only one of the A's three picks
has, and he appears to be no more than a utility player. The
Moneyball draft philosophy again failed to measure up to major league
average in identifying major league talent. In their defense, the
A's did get Andre Ethier in the second round, but again, getting only
one decent regular - and I'm not sure I'd even call him that given his
inability to hit lefties - out of four early round picks from a draft
that had so much talent is a pretty poor track record.
If Moneyball were a
successful philosophy for evaluating amateur or minor league players,
it should
at least yield better than major league average results. The
truth is, however, that even under the most optimal circumstances it's
rate of return is at best average. The A's had a total of 12
picks in the first two rounds of 2002 and
2003 and got 5 major league players, only two of which are legitimate
regular players. A rate of 16% in the first two rounds is not the
kind
of success rate I'd want to hang my hat on or write a book about,
unless it's a "How NOT to do this" kinda book. Under normal
circumstance it
falls far short of the success rate of other low revenue teams like the
Diamondbacks, Rays and Nationals who instead trust "old fashioned"
scouts to evaluate and pick the best talent.
Few will debate that on base percentage is an important function of a
successful major league offense. And drafting college players
generally means the draftee will spend less time in the minors if he
has major league talent. Moneyball defenders will say that the
book was about finding undervalued assets in drafting players, but what
the Moneyball drafts have
pretty clearly shown is that some talents are less valued for a reason,
and that forsaking "tools" in favor of particular
stats
in an amateur draft is a sure path to a lackluster farm system.
Hiring good people to choose the draft picks is far more important than
choosing "good stats" by which to measure them.
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