Chasing
Ben
April 22, 2004
I want to believe.
Even after writing a piece in October
of 2002 about Barry Bonds unreal ascent since 2000, I really do want to believe
that he is on the level when he says he's not supplementing with anything
illegal. But frankly, it's getting nearly impossible to do so.
Can't Hit What You Can't See
They say he can read the bottom of the eye chart, that
he can call whether a pitch is out of the strikezone
the moment it leaves the pitcher's hand. They say that he sees the pitch
better than anyone and that if he sees a pitch he wants to hit, he crushes
it. Jayson Stark wrote extensively about Bonds'
recent home run tear at home, but I'm not sure how valuable a span of 50 at
bats really is. Does anyone really think that Brandon Inge's
last 50 at bats (.333 average, .910 OPS) are really
representative of his level of talent? Regardless, we should look at how
well Bonds is actually seeing the ball.
Here's a table of every strike he's seen since 1987 up until this year:
|
Total |
Strikes |
Swinging |
Pitches |
|
|
|
|
# times |
# made |
% making |
Year |
Pitches |
Taken |
Strikes |
Fouled |
Hits |
SF |
SH |
Outs |
offered |
contact |
contact |
1987 |
2178 |
359 |
182 |
335 |
144 |
3 |
2 |
319 |
985 |
803 |
0.815 |
1988 |
2287 |
376 |
138 |
358 |
152 |
2 |
0 |
304 |
954 |
816 |
0.855 |
1989 |
2528 |
421 |
148 |
410 |
144 |
4 |
0 |
343 |
1049 |
901 |
0.859 |
1990 |
2311 |
423 |
123 |
326 |
156 |
6 |
1 |
280 |
892 |
769 |
0.862 |
1991 |
2378 |
389 |
135 |
395 |
149 |
13 |
0 |
288 |
980 |
845 |
0.862 |
1992 |
2352 |
424 |
124 |
333 |
147 |
7 |
0 |
257 |
868 |
744 |
0.857 |
1993 |
2406 |
341 |
154 |
383 |
181 |
7 |
0 |
279 |
1004 |
850 |
0.847 |
1994 |
1680 |
239 |
100 |
239 |
122 |
3 |
0 |
226 |
690 |
590 |
0.855 |
1995 |
2452 |
390 |
139 |
375 |
149 |
4 |
0 |
274 |
941 |
802 |
0.852 |
1996 |
2558 |
388 |
135 |
367 |
159 |
6 |
0 |
282 |
949 |
814 |
0.858 |
1997 |
2519 |
393 |
169 |
330 |
155 |
5 |
0 |
290 |
949 |
780 |
0.822 |
1998 |
2581 |
406 |
165 |
358 |
167 |
6 |
0 |
293 |
989 |
824 |
0.833 |
1999 |
1678 |
236 |
114 |
284 |
93 |
3 |
1 |
200 |
695 |
581 |
0.836 |
2000 |
2326 |
327 |
144 |
355 |
147 |
7 |
0 |
256 |
909 |
765 |
0.842 |
2001 |
2552 |
382 |
142 |
349 |
156 |
2 |
0 |
227 |
876 |
734 |
0.838 |
2002 |
2164 |
300 |
105 |
293 |
149 |
2 |
0 |
207 |
756 |
651 |
0.861 |
2003 |
2182 |
294 |
125 |
285 |
133 |
2 |
0 |
199 |
744 |
619 |
0.832 |
It's true that he's offering at fewer pitches than he ever
has by rate, but if he's really seeing the ball better, why is his contact rate
also going down? I can understand why the number of times he makes
contact has decreased with the number of opportunities, but if he's seeing the
ball so well, shouldn't we see his contact rate going up, especially if he's
being more selective? Since 1997, with the exception of 2002, his contact
rate is at the lowest it’s been for his entire career.
According to his former hitting coach in
Maybe the proof that he's "seeing the ball better" will show up in
his increased walk rates. Well, let's look at that:
What follows is a year-by-year look Bonds walk totals and rates, broken down by
intentional walks, 4-pitch walks he's seen (of which a good portion in the last
several years are "unintentional" intentional walks) and all other
walks:
Year |
PA |
BB |
IBB |
IBB/PA |
4-pitch walks |
UIBB |
Non-IBB |
BB/500 PA |
IBB/500 PA |
UIBB/500 PA |
HR |
HR/500 PA |
AB |
HR/500AB |
1987 |
611 |
54 |
3 |
0.018 |
11 |
8 |
43 |
44.19 |
2.45 |
6.55 |
25 |
20.46 |
551 |
22.69 |
1988 |
614 |
72 |
14 |
0.044 |
27 |
13 |
45 |
58.63 |
11.40 |
10.59 |
24 |
19.54 |
538 |
22.30 |
1989 |
679 |
93 |
22 |
0.054 |
37 |
15 |
56 |
68.48 |
16.20 |
11.05 |
19 |
13.99 |
580 |
16.38 |
1990 |
621 |
93 |
15 |
0.055 |
34 |
19 |
59 |
74.88 |
12.08 |
15.30 |
33 |
26.57 |
519 |
31.79 |
1991 |
634 |
107 |
25 |
0.065 |
41 |
16 |
66 |
84.38 |
19.72 |
12.62 |
25 |
19.72 |
510 |
24.51 |
1992 |
612 |
127 |
32 |
0.078 |
48 |
16 |
79 |
103.76 |
26.14 |
13.07 |
34 |
27.78 |
473 |
35.94 |
1993 |
674 |
126 |
43 |
0.089 |
60 |
17 |
66 |
93.47 |
31.90 |
12.61 |
46 |
34.12 |
539 |
42.67 |
1994 |
474 |
74 |
18 |
0.068 |
32 |
14 |
42 |
78.06 |
18.99 |
14.77 |
37 |
39.03 |
391 |
47.31 |
1995 |
635 |
120 |
22 |
0.061 |
39 |
17 |
81 |
94.49 |
17.32 |
13.39 |
33 |
25.98 |
506 |
32.61 |
1996 |
675 |
151 |
30 |
0.073 |
49 |
19 |
102 |
111.85 |
22.22 |
14.07 |
42 |
31.11 |
517 |
40.62 |
1997 |
690 |
145 |
34 |
0.099 |
68 |
34 |
77 |
105.07 |
24.64 |
24.64 |
40 |
28.99 |
532 |
37.59 |
1998 |
697 |
130 |
29 |
0.073 |
51 |
22 |
79 |
93.26 |
20.80 |
15.78 |
37 |
26.54 |
552 |
33.51 |
1999 |
434 |
73 |
9 |
0.046 |
20 |
11 |
53 |
84.10 |
10.37 |
12.67 |
34 |
39.17 |
355 |
47.89 |
2000 |
607 |
117 |
21 |
0.081 |
49 |
28 |
68 |
96.38 |
17.30 |
23.06 |
49 |
40.36 |
480 |
51.04 |
2001 |
664 |
177 |
35 |
0.114 |
76 |
41 |
101 |
133.28 |
26.36 |
30.87 |
73 |
54.97 |
476 |
76.68 |
2002 |
612 |
198 |
68 |
0.172 |
105 |
37 |
93 |
161.76 |
55.56 |
30.23 |
46 |
37.58 |
403 |
57.07 |
2003 |
550 |
148 |
61 |
0.156 |
86 |
25 |
62 |
134.55 |
55.45 |
22.73 |
45 |
40.91 |
390 |
57.69 |
UIBB = “Unintentional” intentional walks
Special thanks to STATS, Inc for the providing the raw data. What we see
is a substantial increase (40%!) in four pitch walks
in 2001 and increasing to unprecedented heights in 2002-2003 as managers
ordered their pitchers not to pitch to Bonds, a tactic that almost everyone on
earth has observed.
It's interesting to note the increases:
Bonds total walk rate from 1996-2000: 98.13 per 500 PA
Bonds total walk rate from 2001-present: 143.20 per 500 PA
Bonds' increase in intentional walk rate since the beginning of 2001: 26.72 per
500 PA.
Bonds’ increase in other 4-pitch walks since the beginning of 2001: 9.90
per 500 PA
From 2001-the present, Bonds has experienced an increase in his walk rate of roughly
45 walks per 500 plate appearances. However, 37 walks in that increase
are due to either intentional or unintentional intentional walks. Which means that since 2001, during the most obvious portion of his
current home run surge Bonds has experienced a real walk rate increase of 8
walks per 500 PA.
There's also something else interesting here. The home run rate began to
increase earlier than what many observers cite as his recent breakout.
Most look at the outburst in 2001, but the home run rate showed it's first big jump in 1999. And that was the year he
switched to maple bats. At last, exoneration... maybe.
Good Wood
It has been popularized in the media that Bonds' new maple bats were his secret
weapon in his home run hitting arsenal. The sell job was so complete that
nearly 3 dozen major leaguers switched to maple bats the next season. I
know people who turned in their aluminum softball bats in favor of a maple one.
North American Maple has a hardness rating of 1450 using the Janka scale for wood hardness. The scale is
determined by a test that measures the force required to push a steel ball with
a diameter of 11.28 millimeters (0.444 inches) into the wood to a depth of half
the ball's diameter. White Ash - the wood most commonly used in bats -
has a hardness rating of 1320.
Assuming the maple is truly harder by 10% and not just relatively speaking
compared to other woods on the scale (Brazilian walnut has a hardness rating
3620), the increase in hardness still would not be
transferred perfectly to the ball. In fact, energy transfer to a batted
ball is very inefficient: a baseball struck by a wooden bat will only return
about 32% of the energy exerted on it. So at best, we're looking at an increased energy transference of around 3%. But
that's only an increase in the speed the ball travels off the bat, not the distance.
Factor in the drag of the atmosphere and gravity and the ball might travel an
additional 2%.
In practical terms, if you hit a ball 400 feet with a wooden bat, then picked
up an aluminum bat and hit the same ball under the exact same conditions, you'd
expect the ball to travel much, much farther. But the fact is that it
will only travel about 30 feet farther because the ball isn't perfectly elastic
and the drag of the atmosphere slows the ball in flight. It's pretty
obvious that aluminum is substantially harder and transfers a much greater
amount of energy than maple. The distance increase from using a maple bat
over an ash bat is no more than a few under the most optimum conditions on a
400-foot drive.
There was a study of home runs that indicated that 80% of all home runs hit are
only homers because they travel 5% further than a long out. So the bat
could have been responsible for some of the increase in 1999. However,
Bonds' home run rate keeps increasing, and the increased distance which he has
hit the home runs the last several years (30-50 feet) can't be explained by a
change in wood, especially when you consider that the park he's now playing in
depresses home run balls more than any park in the bigs.
Beginning in 2000 when it opened, Pac Bell has depressed home runs by left
handed hitters by 34% over the average ballpark. With one of the deepest
power alleys in baseball - right center extends 421 feet from home plate - to a
right field wall that stands 25 feet high, Pac Bell (now known as SBC Park) is
a substantially tougher ballyard to homer in than
3Com (Bonds' former home park) which actually boosted home run production the
last three years he played there by 12%. In addition, the sea air,
especially at night, is heavy with moisture, slowing the ball speed
significantly. Yet he's putting balls in the water day or night.
Factoring out the ballpark effects to a neutral ballpark, his home run rate
from 1998 to the present looks like this:
1998 - 25.2/500 non-intentional walk plate appearances
1999 - 38.8/500 NIBB-PA
2000 - 49.6/500 NIBB-PA
2001 - 79.1/500 NIBB-PA
2002 - 58.6/500 NIBB-PA
2003 - 55.4/500 NIBB-PA
The fact that there is a substantial increase from 1999 to 2000, and that even
after a fluky year in 2001, 2002 is substantially higher than 2000, it's pretty
clear that the bat is not the reason for the explosion in power we've witnessed
recently.
When Bonds surpassed Willie Mays with his 661st home run, it was also his 29th
splash hit. A ball that travels directly down the right field line can
reach the water 380' feet from home plate. To the right center power
alley where the wall makes its first zig-zag, a ball
must travel roughly 450' to reach the water. That last splash hit brings
his career total of 450' home runs to 31... 28 of which have been
hit since the beginning of the 2001 season. The only one hit before 2000
occurred at Mile High Stadium in 1993.
Good-bye Mr. Spalding
I thought that maybe the home run distances could be explained away by the fact
that from ballpark to ballpark they use different methods of measuring
home run distance. But then, why would a 450' home run hit at Qualcomm in
1995 be measured any differently than a 450' home run hit at Qualcomm in
2003? The same guy is giving the measurement. Even when a team
moves to a new ballpark, the same guy who measured at the old one will be
measuring at the new one. Unless he's randomly changing the way he
measures home run to home run, the distances of the home runs must remain a part
of the discussion.
The only way to explain the increased distances that he's hitting the ball is
that he's much more explosive and much quicker to the ball.
Them's Good Eats
Maybe his increased bat speed could be explained by his strict exercise and
nutrition regimen. He's stated that he goes into BALCO to check his
magnesium and zinc levels to "make sure he's eating enough broccoli". And he does employ a nutritionist.
However, when Bonds signed his 5-year, $90 million extension, he celebrated by
having a home-cooked meal of fried chicken, collard greens, rice and cornbread
at his mother's. Not exactly the first meal that comes to mind when one
thinks of a strict nutritional regimen. In fact, given the fat content of
fried chicken and cornbread (which is made with buttermilk, shortening and in
many Southern recipes, bacon grease), that might be the last meal that comes to
mind for someone on a rigorously strict diet.
On a personal note, I know vegans and tri-athletes who
live by a strict nutritional regimen also. The reason I bring this up is
that I've never seen any of them go back on their diet. They bring
nutritional bars or fruit or whatever they need with them so if the menu
doesn't suit their diet, they have something to eat. But maybe Bonds'
strict nutritional regimen includes such fatty foods as fried chicken and
cornbread. Or maybe Bonds only eats at his mom's house once per
contract. Either way, as long as his mom's southern home cooking is part
of his offseason nutrition, it doesn't seem like his
diet could play any significant role in his home run barrage.
Maybe it's the workout.
Gary Sheffield has worked out with Bonds in the offseason
several times. In 1996, he had his best season as a professional after
spending the offseason working out with Bonds.
He didn't work out with Bonds again until the offseason
after 2001. After following Bonds' rigorous regime, especially after his
spectacular success in 2001, one would expect
So why did Bonds' regimen work so well for Bonds in 2002, but made
Aaron Comparison
A number of people have compared Bonds late career surge to that of Henry
Aaron. But Barry Bonds (1986-1998) is not like Barry Bonds (1999-
present). The difference between Bonds before 1999 and after is the
difference between Ted Williams (1.117 OPS) and Mike Greenwell (.831 OPS).
Aaron at least bore a resemblance to his earlier successes.
There are explanations for Aaron's big years late in his career. First,
he was enjoying more favorable hitting conditions: strikezone
changes, lowering of the pitching mound, moving to a favorable hitters park. That can't be said of Bonds. If
anything, moving to one of the toughest parks in the majors for hitters should
work against his production.
Another difference between Aaron and Bonds is that Aaron's best year (at age
37) was bracketed by two relatively down years. Using OPS+ as the
measure, Aaron's numbers go from 148 in 1970, to 194 in 1971, back to 147 in
1972. His previous high was 181 (in 1954). His 1971 season is an
increase of around 7% over his previous career best for one year.
Averaged out, his years from age 36 to 39 are only 7% above his career
average. With Aaron, it's reasonable to suggest that his big year in 1971
was somewhat fluky.
Bonds has established a new level of performance and
has had no down years; what he did in 2001 can no longer be described as an
outlier. Bonds went from 162 in 1999, to 191 in 2000 to 262, 275, 231 the last three years. His previous high was
206. That's an increase over his previous career best of 27% for 2 of
those years, and a third at 12% better in a season in which Bonds was dealing
with the illness and death of his father. His career average before 1999
was around 170. Averaged out, his years from age 36 to 39 are 43% above
his career average. Not meaning to state the obvious, but this is not the
same as Hank Aaron.
Another thing to note with Aaron is the significant drop in his doubles
production during this period. Like home runs, doubles are part of the
power equation. It is not uncommon for a hitter to have a down year in
homers, only to experience a career year in doubles, or visa versa. A
jump in home run total could be the result of a batter opening up his swing
more to pull the ball towards the nearer outfield walls, or line-drives
catching a little more wind and clearing the wall instead of hitting a foot
below. The actual power is the same, it just takes the
form of homers instead of doubles. There have been studies within the
last 10 years that prove this theory to be true.
With Aaron, I suspect as he drew closer to Ruth's record, he opened up his
swing more to try to hit more home runs and in the process, sacrificed some of
the doubles. In fact, that looks to be the case as he averaged 30-35
doubles for most of his career, but as he approached Ruth, his doubles dropped
precipitously from 26 in 1970, to 22 in 1971 to around 12 per season for the
rest of his career as he chased, caught and surpassed Ruth in home runs..
But with Bonds, there has been no decrease in the rate of doubles. They have
stayed constant relative to his number of opportunities. So again, these
two are very different cases.
Others
One of Hank Aaron's teammates, Davey Johnson, is
also cited as a comparable player coming up big after bulking up. He went
from a previous career best of 18 homers to setting a record for second basemen
with 43 for the 1973 Braves. However, he was going from a ballpark that
reduced home run hitting by as much as 25% over league average to one that
increased home run hitting by as much as 15% to right handed hitters like
Johnson. In addition, his walk rate was improving and, if you buy the
theory of protection in the line-up, he went from a line-up devoid of power (Boog Powell led the Os with 21 homers and was the only
hitter with more than 12) to a line-up replete with power hitters (five
regulars had at least 15 home runs and three finished the season with 40 or
more). Most importantly, he was only 30 years old, still in his peak
years. He had a better place to hit, better line-up to hit in, increased selectivity
and strength... the sum of which should equal a big year from
Johnson. This was also the only season in his career Johnson hit more
than 20 homers. Bonds has been at this level for
at least 4 years. The only aspect that is similar to Bonds is the
increased strength. Again, two very different cases.
Comparisons to other hitters like Andres Galarraga,
Gary Gaetti, Hank Sauer and Darrel Evans who had good
years late in their careers also fall apart because they only did it for a year
or their late career success didn't surpass what they had done previously or
because the surge was punctuated by down seasons.
Caminiti Comparison
If there's a player in recent memory who's performance
surge mirrors Bonds, it might be Ken Caminiti.
His increase especially in home run rate and OPS+ is similar, not in overall
magnitude, but in percentage increase.
Caminiti admits he started taking steroids in the
middle of 1996, his MVP season. He hit 28 of his 40 homers after the
break that year and 21 of those 28 were hit in August and September, plenty of
time for him to start enjoying the benefits of use. After averaging an
OPS+ of 120 the previous four seasons with a high of 138 in 1995, Caminiti vaulted to 173 at age 33, an increase of 25% over
his previous best and 49% better than his career average. His home run
rate that season (once every 13.65 ABs) was
substantially better than his previous career best (once every 20.2 ABs accomplished the year before) and nearly twice his
career rate (once every 26.3 at bats).
However, the good times weren't to last. He began to break down more
frequently the following year, but it wasn't necessarily because he was using
steroids. The problem was that he was mis-using
them. When he began, he used them non-stop rather than the directed use
of cycling them with a down period. The result was permanent damage to
his body. He has never been specific how long he used them without
cycling other than to say he misused them "initially", but since his
testosterone levels dropped 80% below normal according to his doctor, I'm led
to believe that we're talking about more than just a couple of weeks misuse.
Regardless, even with the drop in testosterone levels and the constant pulls
and strains of ligaments and muscles he experienced over the rest of his
career, he was still able to generate an average of 135 OPS+ for the next 4
years properly using steroids, which was still 16% better than his career
average. Caminiti had some well-documented
troubles with other substances during this period as well, so it's not clear
how much more effective the steroid use could have been.
Brady Anderson is another player who showed similar percentage gains for a
period of 4 years. From 1996-1999 (ages 32-35), his production using OPS+
averaged 18% above his career average and his surprising 1996 season in which
he hit 50 homers was 45% better. Although he has never admitted using
steroids, the rumors are well-circulated about
Conclusion
There's a lot to digest here. The statistics say that he's much stronger
and more explosive than he ever has been. They also show that no other
part of his game has substantially improved over the last 5 years and that some
aspects are noticeably declining. There is no evidence that his bat, diet
or the specific exercises he does in his workout regimen are the secret to his
success. And then there's the fog surrounding the degree of his
involvement in the BALCO case.
This generation of sports fans has been witness to some of the greatest
athletes in history, several of whom were not only supremely talented, but
driven to the point of obsession about maximizing their body's potential.
Yet Jerry Rice, Walter Payton, Wayne Gretsky and
Michael Jordan all showed their age as they entered their mid to late 30s with
a loss of speed and explosiveness. Bonds has
not; his has increased.
A number of baseball pitchers became more effective as they entered their
twilight years, but in every case it was entirely due to an increase in guile
and knowledge of their opponent, not because they were throwing the ball 10%
harder than they did when they were 25 or 30. Hitters don't hit the ball
harder and farther because they're smarter; they hit it farther because they
are stronger and quicker.
So it really comes down to this: the characteristics of Bonds' improvements in
physical performance are consistent with steroid use. The question is can
someone achieve those same increases without them at his age? In an MSNBC
poll, 82% of the fans said they cared if athletes are using steroids and almost
50% said they believed it was a serious problem. The results of the BALCO
case will shed more light on this topic. Until then, the vast majority of
us are left to wonder: are we seeing something truly great, or just another Ben
Johnson?
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